Psychophysical experiments have demonstrated that visual information is used to construct a number of representations of the three-dimensional structure of our environment, and may be used in a variety of specific ways in order to perform perceptual tasks and to control our actions. There remain however important unanswered questions about the nature of these representations and their relationship to perceptual experience. The first question relates to the nature of the representation of depth. While there is broad agreement that multiple representations are involved, there is some disagreement about the exact nature and relationship between these representations.
INTRODUCTION
Perhaps the simplest unanswered question of all that one could ask about binocular vision is the following: how do we perceive depth on the basis of binocular cues, and how does this differ from the perception of depth on the basis of other cues? That this question remains unanswered is perhaps no more than a statement that we do not yet have a completed science of binocular vision. Assessing exactly what it is that we still don't know, however, allows us to specify a number of more directed questions. This article seeks to make a number of these explicit. Firstly, a brief review of the literature on the nature of depth representations is provided, and it is argued that a consensus on the form taken by these representations has yet to be reached. Secondly, the more difficult question of how these representations relate to our perceptual experience is addressed. Finally, the possibility is discussed that our perception of depth on the basis of binocular cues might differ fundamentally from monocular depth perception.
THE GEOMETRICAL NATURE OF THREE-DIMENSIONAL REPRESENTATIONS
The intuitive starting point, taken by both Gibson (1950) and Marr (1982) , is that binocular vision serves to provide a depth-map, an image-like representation describing the distance to every point in the scene (see Note 1). This assumption is shared by the computer vision community, in which a depth map is the accepted goal of most stereo algorithms (Brown et al., 2003; Scharstein and Szeliski, 2002) . Another important idea, that all visual cues feed into a single, common representation of this form (Berkeley, 1709) , is often assumed in current models of depth perception (Landy et al., 1995) . The notion of a single representation, generated from all the available information and available to support all tasks is an intuitively appealing one. It has not however stood up well to empirical investigation. The first objection is that people are surprisingly bad at the kinds of judgements that such a representation ought to support. For example, while observers have no difficulty in judging which of two points is closer when they are presented in isolation, their performance on this task deteriorates dramatically when these points are embedded in complex surfaces (Norman and Todd, 1998) , or cluttered natural scenes (Bouzit and Hibbard, 2006) . At the very least, such examples demonstrate that if we do represent three-dimensional structure in terms of a depth map, this does not simply describe the distance to each image location independently. Rather, interactions over some spatial neighbourhood need to be defined, for example in order to represent depth relative to a locally defined reference frame, rather than relative to the observer (Glennerster and McKee, 2004; Glennerster et al., 2002; Petrov and Glennerster, 2004) .
Other psychophysical evidence however contradicts the notion of any single representation of depth that could account for performance in all tasks. Johnston and Passmore (1994) showed that observers could accurately discriminate the curvature of surfaces for which the total change in slant across the surface was smaller by an order of magnitude than the just noticeable difference in slant. Moreover, changes in the direction of illumination of the surfaces had opposite effects on the discriminability of slant and curvature. This latter result, in particular, is hard to reconcile with the notion that all three-dimensional shape judgements rely on a common representation. It thus appears that the perception of three-dimensional
